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Efficient Contracting, Earnings Smoothing and Managerial Accounting 
Discretion  
1. Introduction  
The efficient contracting perspective of accounting choices provides evidence consistent 
with the idea that managers exercise accounting discretion to increase their compensation, 
avoid debt covenants violation, and reduce the chance of exposure to political or 
governmental intrusions in its business’s affairs. Management may also tend to smooth the 
reported earnings in an attempt to meet investors’ expectations of future cash flows. [1]  
Accounting choices have been the subject of several studies, the majority of studies were 
related generally to well-developed capital markets, and in particular to the US and the UK, 
in which the ownership of companies is well dispersed among outside shareholders and 
investor protection is strong. However, relatively few studies have directly addressed the 
trade-offs among accounting choices in emerging countries. In this study, we extend this 
area of research by utilizing a unique dataset and focusing upon explaining the accounting 
choices for an emerging market, namely Egypt, which is characterized by highly concentrated 
ownership and poor investor protection.  
Egypt is considered to be an ideal setting to conduct this study for several reasons. First, 
whilst the Egyptian privatization programme started in the second half of the 1990s, 
corporate ownership is still highly concentrated within families, the State, and banks. A 
fundamental problem related to such concentrated ownership is how information asymmetry 
between controlling and minority shareholders (and other users, including debt holders, 
customers, suppliers, and employees) is addressed. While recognizing the role of timely 
financial statements in channelling information, the information asymmetry problem in 
emerging countries is more likely resolved by closer personal channels and private 
communications with dominant shareholders (Ball et al., 2000).  This is likely lead to the 
3 
diversion (or abuse) of firm resources by controlling shareholders. For example, the existing 
voting rules in Egypt entitle the controlling owners to elect board members to represent their 
interests at the expense of minority shareholders. The majority of Egyptian board members 
are considered weak because they are usually chosen from family, close relatives, and friends 
who lack adequate financial knowledge (Sourial 2004). This is, in turn, more likely 
encourage resource expropriation and allow controlling shareholders to more easily manage 
the firm’s reported earnings (e.g., Guthrie  and  Sokolowsky, 2010).  
Second, although a considerable improvement has been made in reducing differences 
between the Egyptian Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs), there are still some concerns about weak enforcement, lack of implementation 
guidelines, and inadequate knowledge of IFRSs (including their Arabic translation), leading 
to poor-quality financial reporting in general and the inability to limit managers’ scope to 
manage earnings (ROSC, 2009). 
Finally, expected litigation cost is another fundamental variable that influences 
managers’ disclosure decisions (Kothari et al., 1988). It is expected that the propensity to 
manage earnings is more likely to increase when ligation costs are low. In the Egyptian 
setting, in which civil litigation, securities lawsuits and regulatory costs are rare, managers 
are more likely to engage in earnings management. For example, although the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) has administrative sanctioning powers, including de-listing, suspension of 
licences, cancelling transactions, and imposing monetary penalties, weak enforcement has 
been a feature of the Egyptian system (ROSC, 2009). In addition, the regulatory framework 
contains a significant number of overlapping and ambiguous laws, as listed firms are under 
the authority of several agencies with overlapping jurisdiction, which weakens law 
enforcement (ROSC, 2009). Consequently, such institutional characteristics are expected to 
allow managers to opportunistically exercise discretion over reported earnings.  
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Prior theoretical and empirical accounting studies have focused on the extent to which 
earnings are managed to achieve particular objective. [2] Despite valuable contributions 
provided by this stream of research in understanding the causes and consequences of 
managerial discretion, such empirical studies give only peripheral attention to the potential 
trade-offs among several competing reporting objectives that are likely to explain accounting 
choices. Notable exceptions are Young (1998), Darrough et al. (1998), Heflin et al. (2002), 
and Dey et al. (2008). Young (1998) finds little evidence to support the efficient contracting 
explanation for managerial discretion choices in the UK.  Darrough et al. (1998) also provide 
support for leverage incentive only for the years after the Japanese market crash of 1990 and 
for the political costs hypothesis prior to the crash. They also show that Japanese managers 
choose income-increasing accounting accruals to increase their bonus and increase the 
amount of outside funding. By focusing on a sample of US listed firms, Heflin et al. (2002) 
find that managers use accounting latitude to reduce the possibility of debt covenants 
violation and to avoid political costs.  
In an Egypt context, Dey et al. (2008) find evidence that is consistent with the bonus 
plans and debt contracts objectives. However, their study uses a single account approach, 
whereby earnings management is measured in specific areas of the financial statements, such 
as depreciation and inventory. Our study differs in a significant respect, in that we use 
abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings management throughout the financial statements 
rather than a more limited single account approach. [3] In addition, our study is superior to 
that undertaken by Dey et al. (2008) as our sample size is also larger and more recently 
collected.  
Our findings contribute to the existing literature in two main ways. First, as the reporting 
practices are closely linked to their institutional context (Ball et al., 2000), generalization of 
findings from studies conducted in developed countries may be misleading and inappropriate 
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when used to explain accounting choices in emerging countries. Therefore, using a unique 
data set that reflects distinct legal and institutional features helps shed additional light on the 
role of the institutional characteristics in explaining accruals choices in an emerging 
economy. Furthermore, the institutional environment and incentives and payout preferences 
of managers and large shareholders in managing reported earnings have potentially greater 
influence in explaining accruals choices than other factors, such as adoption of IFRSs.  
Second, unlike previous studies that are restricted to testing an individual objective, the 
results of this study provide greater insights into understanding the trade-offs among 
competing reporting objectives and determinants of accounting choice. Only focusing on a 
single objective at a time may lead to insufficient evidence about incentives that explain 
accounting choices; the same accounting choice may result in accomplishing several 
objectives (Fields et al. 2001). For example, income increasing choices that drive higher 
managerial compensation to benefit managers at the expense of other parties may also serve 
to avoid debt covenants violations, which may harm creditors and benefit other stakeholders 
(Fields et al. 2001). Similarly, results of studies that focus on a single accounting choice at a 
time are also limited because most managers are likely to seek to accomplish one or more 
reporting objectives using a single choice or a portfolio of accounting choices (Fields et al. 
2001, Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
Our analysis yields interesting results. We find that the traditional costly contracting 
incentives explain little of the variations in accounting choices (i.e., discretionary accruals) in 
the Egyptian context, while earnings smoothing activity explains much of the cross sectional 
variation in managerial choices. Specifically, managers are likely to use the accrual 
component in an attempt to reduce the fluctuation in reported earnings by increasing 
(decreasing) earnings when earnings are low (high) in attempt to reduce the variability of the 
reported earnings either to gain personal and/or attain the contractual objectives. [4]  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our 
empirical hypotheses, while in Section 3 we provide the methodology. Section 4 provides 
description of the data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents our empirical findings 
from univariate and multivariate analysis. Section 6 introduces additional tests. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Executive bonus plans hypothesis 
A number of studies have reported that managers use discretionary accruals in an attempt 
to maximize their compensation. For example, Healy (1985) points out that compensation 
schemes do not always induce managers to select income-increasing accounting choices. 
Rather, managers are likely to choose income-decreasing accruals to save income to increase 
their future expected bonus when current reported earnings are beyond the bounds embedded 
in compensation contracts (i.e., above the upper limit or below the lower limit). However, 
managers may choose income-increasing accruals when the current level of reported earnings 
is within these bounds. In a similar vein, Holthausen et al. (1995) find that managers make 
more income-decreasing choices when their bonus is at the upper bound than when it is 
between the lower and upper bounds. However, they do not find the same result when 
bonuses are below the lower bound. Holthausen et al. (1995) find that discretionary accruals 
are more negative (i.e., income decreasing choice), when the CEO bonus is at the upper 
bound than when it is between the lower and upper bounds. They also find that managers 
manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum.  
Several studies document evidence supporting the view that managers manipulate 
earnings when their potential compensation is linked with the value of shares and options. 
For example, Cheng and Warfield (2005) demonstrate that the sensitivity of manager’s 
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wealth to the short-term stock price may motivate managers with high stock-based 
compensations and stock equity to manage earnings. More specifically, they emphasize that 
those managers are more likely to report earnings that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts and 
sell more shares in the year after earnings announcement. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) 
also find a significant association between equity incentives and abnormal accruals.  
To test the relation between discretionary accruals and compensation, detailed bonus 
plans data should be available. Due to the unavailability of detailed compensation data in the 
annual reports or in any other sources, in addition to the secrecy embedded in the Egyptian 
disclosure environment (Dahawy and Conover, 2007, Dey et al., 2008), and the absence of 
regulation that enforces disclosure of this information, it is not expected that managers would 
disclose such information voluntarily. Therefore, following prior studies (Young, 1998), 
executive ownership is used as a proxy for the compensation objective. Executive equity 
ownership may reduce the underlying agency conflicts that exist either between managers 
and outside shareholders or between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
According to this view, the more stocks executives own, the greater their degree of 
managerial control and the stronger their motivation to take actions that may lead to a lower 
earnings management (Warfield et al., 1995). Hence, our testable hypothesis is formulated as 
follows:  
 
H1. Earnings management is negatively related to managerial equity ownership. 
 
2.2. Debt covenants hypothesis 
Since debt agreements depend on accounting numbers reported in financial statements, 
managers have the opportunity to choose accounting methods that allow them to avoid 
violating these agreements. These contracts often include restrictive covenants that limit 
potential conflicts of interest between firms’ debt holders and shareholders as well as restrict 
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managers’ scope to engage in activities that may adversely affect the debt holders’ wealth. 
These include limiting the ability of management to issue new debt and giving the debt 
holders the right to demand early repayment of the debt when certain accounting numbers are 
not maintained (Press and Weintrop, 1990, Duke and Hunt, 1990). These studies provide 
evidence that supports the assertion that firms with debt covenants based on accounting 
numbers may have greater incentives to conceal the firm’s real economic performance and 
inflate reported earnings by, for example, engaging in income-increasing accrual choices in 
an attempt to reduce the possibility of default.   
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) report that managers manipulate abnormal accruals 
upward to increase the reported income in the year prior to violation and, to a lesser extent, in 
the year of the covenant violation. Charitou et al. (2007) find a similar result in one year prior 
to bankruptcy-filing. Likewise, Sweeney (1994) finds significantly greater use of income-
increasing accounting changes in defaulting firms relative to a control sample, matched on 
industry, size, and time period. In addition, she demonstrates that defaulting firms tend to 
undertake early adoption of new accounting standards when these standards increase the 
reported net income. In a similar vein, Healy and Palepu (1990) emphasize that firms that are 
close to default on their dividend restriction are likely to reduce dividends payment and 
switch to income-increasing accounting methods. However, DeAngelo et al. (1994) 
demonstrate that managers of financially troubled firms that reduced dividends make income-
decreasing accounting decisions even though dividends payments are under pressure due to 
private debt agreements. Furthermore, they conclude that accounting choices reflect the 
firms’ financial difficulties rather than attempts to avoid debt covenant violation, or inflate 
reported income to disguise the financial difficulties. Similar evidence is also found by 
Peltier-Rivest (1999) who shows that managers of troubled firms with binding debt covenants 
do not adopt income-increasing accounting choices.  
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Thus, it is expected that managers of highly leveraged firms are likely to make income-
increasing accounting choices in an attempt to avoid such violation. This leads into the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2.  Earnings management is positively related to leverage. 
 
2.3. Political costs hypothesis 
Since large firms are usually more politically visible, abnormally large increases in 
reported earnings may be used as an indicator of a monopoly or used as an excuse for 
political or governmental intrusions in their business’s affairs (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1990). Thus, managers of large firms are expected to have greater incentives to make 
accounting choices that reduce the likelihood of these political costs being incurred.  
It is found that firms use income-decreasing discretionary accruals in industries applying 
to the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) for import relief (Jones, 1991), 
and in firms under investigation for anti-trust dealings during the year of the investigation 
(Cahan, 1992). Similar results are found in the cable television industry (Key, 1997), and in 
chemical firms exposed to the Superfund laws (Cahan et al., 1997, Johnston and Rock, 2005).  
In the oil industry, Han and Wang (1998) show that petroleum refining firms tend to 
make negative discretionary accruals and report good news late in an attempt to reduce 
political costs as early release of good news would attract additional public attention, which 
may increase their exposure to political actions. More recently, Byard et al. (2007) support 
the political costs hypothesis for a sample of US-based oil companies. Consistent with Han 
and Wang (1998), they find that large petroleum refining firms engage in significant 
abnormal income-decreasing accruals in the 4th fiscal quarter of 2005 immediately after the 
impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  
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Similarly, Hall (1993) demonstrates that the increased scrutiny of oil firms are likely to 
motivate managers to make more income-decreasing accounting changes in periods of sharp 
oil price increases than in other periods. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H3.  Earnings management is negatively related to firm size. 
 
2.4. Earnings smoothing hypotheses 
Earnings smoothing has been the subject of concern of regulatory and accounting studies 
alike. [5] Managers may tend to use accounting discretion afforded by accounting standards 
to reduce the fluctuations of earnings in an attempt to report a less variable earnings stream 
and also show that the company has less risk (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). Managers can do 
so by, for example, understating earnings in years of high performance in order to create  
reserves for future periods (Leuz et al., 2003). However, it is found that managers may 
engage in earnings smoothing even if managerial compensation is not tied with earnings 
(Hermann and Inoue, 1996). 
It is found that managers smooth earnings in an attempy to reduce the possibility of 
being dismissed (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995, DeFond and Park, 1997). Trueman and Titman 
(1988) provide evidence for use of earnings smoothing as a cost minimizing device. They 
indicate that when a firm faces a high level of earnings volatility, the possibility of 
bankruptcy will be greater. They argue that earnings smoothing serves to influence 
shareholders’ perception of the stability of reported earnings and therefore their assessment of 
the likelihood of firm bankruptcy. Earnings smoothing is also thought of as an equilibrium 
solution to compensate informed managers for their information advantages and for taking 
additional risk (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006). Developing an analytical model to explain 
incentives of managers to smooth earnings, Goel and Thakor (2003) find that the degree of 
earnings smoothing is higher for firms whose manager’s compensation contract is tied to 
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long-run performance, firms with higher uncertainty about the earnings volatility, and firms 
characterized by diffuse ownership. 
Although earnings smoothing behaviour is documented in several contexts, we expect 
that earnings smoothing objectives may explain a larger amount of the variation in accruals 
choices in Egypt than efficient contracting objectives. This expectation stems from the 
premise that, in developed capital markets, suppliers of capital commonly contract with 
managers in an attempt to prevent the diversion of corporate resources to managers’ personal 
consumption. Contractual relationships play a crucial role in aligning divergent objectives of 
various contracting parties, reducing information asymmetry and encouraging managers to use 
the reporting flexibility to improve reporting quality (Badertscher et al., 2012). However, in 
less developed capital markets, the demand for accounting income is expected to be less 
clear-cut. This is because the demand for accounting income is closely related to the payout 
preferences of controlling shareholders rather than the demand for public disclosure (Ball et 
al., 2000). Also, weak legal protection and lax oversight are more likely to give greater 
discretion over earnings and allow managers to further reduce income volatility.  
More generally, Leuz et al. (2003) argue that reporting earnings with lower variance 
creates opacity, which may help insiders to expropriate from outside investors. The results of 
a survey conducted by Graham et al. (2005) show that managers believe that firms with 
smoother earnings are thought by investors to be less risky and associated with lower cost of 
equity and expected return. Therefore, managers can smooth reported earnings to accomplish 
several market and contracting motivations, including managerial compensation (e.g., 
Truman and Titman, 1988), political costs (e.g., Cahan, 1992, Godfrey and Jones, 2002), and 
to signal the financial stability of the firm to meet interest commitments and avoid violation 
of debt covenants.  
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Prior studies such as Leuz et al. (2003) and Lang et al. (2006) measure earnings 
smoothing as the ratio of standard deviation of operating income and the standard deviation 
of operating cash flow (both scaled by lagged total assets). Based on the preceding 
discussion, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H4.a Earnings management is negatively related to the ratio of standard deviation of 
operating income and the standard deviation of operating cash flow.  
 
The combination of cash flows from operations and accruals constitute the level of 
reported earnings. Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) show that the level of reported 
earnings allows investors to infer the level of permanent future cash flows. Keeping 
fluctuation to a minimum level, therefore, could improve investors’ expectations about this 
important future component. Sloan (1996) finds that investors over-estimate the persistence 
of accruals (i.e. as firms with relatively low (high) magnitudes of accruals, earn positive 
(negative) risk-adjusted returns. In response to this situation, firms facing an increase 
(decrease) in operating cash flows may engage in income decreasing (increasing) accrual 
manipulation to maintain smoothed earnings. Although accruals and cash flows are naturally 
negatively correlated (Dechow, 1994), larger association may suggest greater earning 
smoothing (Lang et al., 2006, Leuz et al., 2003). Accordingly, the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals is expected to be greater (smaller) for poor (good) cash flow firms. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H4.b Earnings management is negatively related to changes in cash flows from 
operation. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Proxies for earnings management 
We employ the cross-sectional approach of the modified Jones model suggested by 
Dechow et al. (1995), and the performance-adjusted Jones model suggested by Kothari et al. 
(2005) to isolate discretionary accruals, which are used as proxies for earnings management. 
This approach allows us to reduce the survivorship bias problem inherent in time-series 
models and to overcome the problem of unavailability of sufficient time-series data needed 
(at least nine years) to estimate firm-specific coefficients, as well as relax the assumption that 
the estimated coefficients are stationary (Kothari et al., 2005). We measure discretionary 
accruals (DAC), when the modified Jones model is used, as the residuals from the 
following industry-year model:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1⁄ = α + β1�∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1⁄ � + β2�𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1⁄ �  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (1) 
where TACC is the firm i’s  total accruals, calculated as earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations minus cash flow from operating activities,  TA is firm i’s  
book value of total assets in year t, Δ REV is firm i’s changes in net revenues between year t-
1 and year t, ΔREC is firm i’s change in receivables between year t-1 and year t, GPPE is  
firm i’s gross property, plant and equipment, β1, β2, and β3 are  the estimated parameters; ε  is 
the error term for firm, i is a firm indicator, and t is a time indicator. The procedures of the 
performance-adjusted model are similar to that explained above, with the addition of the 
contemporaneous return on assets (ROA), measured as net income before extraordinary items 
to total assets, to Eq. (1). 
Two modifications to the original models are adopted. Since there is no particular event 
to be examined, the first modification involves adjusting firm discretionary accruals by 
subtracting the changes in accounts receivable from the changes in revenues in the estimation 
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period as in the test period (Kasznik, 1999), as ignoring effects of receivables may reduce  the 
power of the test (McNichols, 2000). Additionally, there is no reason to think that earnings 
management is expected to be only in the test period (McNichols, 2000). The second 
modification involves the inclusion of an intercept without scaling by lagged total assets. This 
is because there is no theoretical reason for forcing the regression through the origin or to 
believe that total accruals will be zero when changes in cash sales and gross property plant 
and equipment are zero. 
 
3.2. Research design and empirical model 
To test the trade-offs among multiple contracting and income smoothing objectives, we 
include a set of explanatory variables related to determinants of discretionary accruals choice. 
We model the contracting objectives as a function of bonus plans, debt covenants, and political 
costs. Executive ownership, EXECOWN, defined as the percentage of equity ownership 
owned by the CEO and executive directors to the total shares outstanding, is used as a proxy 
for the compensation objective. It is argued that leverage is positively related to both the 
existence of and closeness to accounting-based debt covenants and debt-to-equity ratio 
captures the existence and tightness of most common debt covenant restrictions (see Press 
and Weintrop, 1990 and Duke and Hunt, 1990, among others). We, therefore, use the ratio of 
total debts to net book value of equity, DEBT/EQUITY, as a proxy of closeness to debt 
covenants violation. [6]  
In an attempt to test the political cost hypothesis, researchers usually focus on firm 
characteristics, such as firm size. However, this proxy has faced much theoretical criticism. 
For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) and Christie (1990) describe firm size as a noisy 
proxy for political costs that may be used as a proxy for many effects other than political cost. 
Moreover, while concentrating only on large firms may make the test stronger and reduce test 
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noise, it may weaken the power of the test as a result of testing only small samples (Hall, 
1993). We use firm size is, SIZE, measured as the natural logarithm end-year book value of 
total assets of a firm, as a proxy of political costs and also to control for the correlation 
between size and accounting choice (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
Following Leuz et al. (2003) and Lang et al. (2006), we measure earnings smoothing, 
SMOOTH, as the ratio of standard deviation of operating income and the standard deviation 
of operating cash flow (both scaled by lagged total assets). [7] We interpret a low value of 
this measure as indicating that managers are more inclined to exercise accounting discretion 
to smooth reported earnings. An earnings smoothness proxy is calculated using rolling 
windows of three annual observations. Cash flow from operation is computed directly from 
the statement of cash flows. We also incorporate in our analysis change in cash flow from 
operations, ΔCFO, defined as cash from operating activities in the current year less cash from 
operating activities in the previous year, as a proxy for implicit income smoothing inherent in 
accrual generation. Although the association between accruals and cash flow from operation 
is naturally negative, a larger magnitude of this association is more likely to indicate 
smoothing of reported earnings to conceal the underlying corporate economic performance 
(Leuz et al., 2003, Lang et al., 2006).  
The analysis also considers several other control variables. Two dummy variables are 
used, First, CFOH, defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the cash 
flow from operations is included in the highest decile of cash flow from operations and zero 
otherwise. Second,  CFOL, defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the 
cash flow from operations is included in the lowest decile of cash flow from operations and 
zero otherwise. Both dummy variables are used to control for discretionary accruals 
measurement error, which is found to be negatively associated with cash flow performance 
(Dechow et al., 1995, Young, 1999).  In addition, two dummy variables are used to control 
16 
for abnormal reported earnings. First, EARNH, defined as a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one when the reported earnings is included in the highest decile of the reported 
earnings and zero otherwise. Second, EARNL, defined as a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one when the reported earnings is included in the lowest decile of the reported 
earnings and zero otherwise. 
Additionally, the ratio of long-term assets to total assets is used as a proxy for assets 
intensity, ASSINT, to control for the possible impact of the depreciation charge on estimations 
of discretionary accruals (Young, 1998). Market-to-book ratio, MTBOOK, measured as the 
ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity to book value of assets, is used as a proxy for growth opportunities (Krishnan, 2003). 
Additionally, firms that constitute the Egyptian Exchange Index 30 may have larger abnormal 
accruals because they possibly have the ability and resources to boost the reported earnings 
through using, for example, discretionary accruals. EGX30 is a dummy variable introduced in 
the analyses to control for this possibility. Finally, we control for industry and time effects 
(not reported) using IndustryDum and TimeDum as indicator variables. The following 
regression is used to test the hypotheses: 
 
  DACi,t = ∝ +𝛽𝛽1EXECOWNi,t + 𝛽𝛽2 LEVi,t + 𝛽𝛽3 SIZEi,t + 𝛽𝛽4 ∆CFOi,t + 𝛽𝛽5 SMOOTHi,t +
𝛽𝛽6  ASSINTi,t + 𝛽𝛽7 CFOLi,t + 𝛽𝛽8 CFOHi,t + 𝛽𝛽9 EARNLi,t + 𝛽𝛽10  EARNHi,t +
𝛽𝛽11 MTBOOKi,t + 𝛽𝛽12 EGX30 i,t + 𝜀𝜀i,t                                                                            (2)  
 
 
where, i and t are firm and time subscripts respectively, ε is an error term, and all other 
variables are as defined in Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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4. Data and descriptive statistics 
4.1. Data 
For our empirical analysis, we use a sample of listed non-financial Egyptian firms over 
the period (2005 to 2007). Accounting data are obtained from the Egyptian Exchange (EGX). 
Data on ownership structure is collected from the Egypt for Information Dissemination 
(EGID) and the Capital Market Authority (CMA). The market values of equity are extracted 
from monthly and annually bulletins issued by EGID (various issues). Several screening 
criteria were applied to the data before carrying out the empirical analysis. First, for the 
purpose of discretionary accruals’ estimations, we chose firms with no missing data over the 
period (2004 to 2007). [8] Second, firms should not be involved in merger or acquisition 
events as these firms tend to be larger for reasons other than earnings management behaviour. 
Thirdly, firms should not belong to the financial or regulated sectors as their disclosure 
requirements and accruals generation are different from those of other firms. In addition, 
regulation of these firms makes their accounting information incomparable to that in other 
industries and earnings management incentives differ from those of unregulated industries. 
Finally, we cleared outliers and potential data error in the dataset by excluding the values of 
each variable that lie outside the 1st and the 99th percentiles. This process yields a final 
sample of 438 observations.  
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 reports summary descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. 
The table indicates that the average (median) abnormal accrual as a percentage of beginning 
total assets is 0.0000 (-0.007) using the modified Jones model and they are qualitatively 
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similar when the performance-adjusted model is used. On average, the executive directors 
own 10.6 per cent of firm shares. In addition, the leverage ratio, on average, is 41.1 per cent.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The Pearson correlation matrix in Table 3 shows that correlation coefficients seem 
reasonable. For example, larger companies are more likely to have a large ratio of debt-to-
equity and their motivations to smooth earnings are higher than in small companies. Also, 
most of the firms that constitute EGX30 are large firms. [9]  
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Univariate analysis 
The univariate analysis includes a mean (median) comparison test using t-test 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney). The samples of discretionary accruals are designed on the basis 
of the median of each explanatory variable in the case of scale variables or using the two 
categories in the case of dichotomous variables. These tests aim to show whether the mean of 
discretionary accruals measures differs across the two categories of each explanatory 
variable. For example, it is hypothesized that there is a significant difference in terms of 
executive directors’ ownership, debt-to-equity ratio, firm size and earnings smoothing 
between firms in the above and below median subsamples.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The results in Table 4 show that firms with negative cash flow changes make 
significantly higher discretionary accruals compared to those with positive cash flow 
changes. In contrast, the results do not support the managerial ownership, leverage and 
political costs hypotheses for any earnings management proxy. In summary, the univariate 
analysis provides evidence that accruals choices in Egypt are likely to be driven by income 
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smoothing objectives and contracting objectives explain little of the variations in abnormal 
accruals. 
 
5.2. Regression results 
The results of univariate analysis reveal a weak association between earnings 
management and all efficient contracting objectives. The univariate analysis, however, does 
not control for the effects of other variables that may be related to discretionary accruals or to 
other efficient contracting objectives, which may result in potential effects, confounding the 
earnings management-efficient contracting objectives relationship. 
Therefore, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression with robust standard errors to correct 
for heteroskedasticity is employed to test the trade-offs between efficient contracting and 
earning smoothing incentives. In Table 5, we use the total discretionary accruals as measured 
by the modified Jones model (MJTDA) and the performance-adjusted Jones model (PATDA) 
as our dependent variables. We start the multivariate analysis with Model 1, in which only 
the control variables are included. In order to judge the marginal predictive power of 
explanatory variables in determining discretionary accruals choices, all independent and 
control variables are examined in Model 2. In addition, a vector of industry dummies 
IndustryDum, and time dummies TimeDum are incorporated to control for industry-fixed 
effects and year-fixed effects respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 In general, the coefficients of most variables are in line with their predicted signs. In 
contrast to our expectations, the results in Table 5 reveal that the estimated coefficients of 
EXWCOWN, SIZE, and DEBT/EQUITY are not significant. These results provide no support 
for the executive bonus plans, political costs, or debt covenants hypotheses. This implies that 
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large firms are less likely to make income decreasing choices in an attempt to increase their 
compensation or to reduce the likelihood of governmental intrusions in firm affairs. This 
result is inconsistent with the debt covenants hypothesis, suggesting that managers of highly 
leveraged firms are unlikely to make income-increasing accounting choices in an attempt to 
prevent debt covenants violation.  
However, both income smoothing variables are highly significant for both alternative 
discretionary accruals estimation models. More specifically, the coefficient of ∆CFO is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level for both discretionary accruals 
proxies. This result implies that firms with positive cash flow changes are more likely to 
manipulate earnings downward to adversely affect the reporting earnings level in order to 
smooth the reporting earnings and reduce their fluctuations at minimum levels. This negative 
association is consistent with prior studies (for example DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). 
Similarly, the coefficient of SMOOTH is significantly negative at the 1 per cent level for the 
two earnings management proxies. Managers, therefore, are more likely to exercise 
accounting discretion using the accrual component in order to smooth reported earnings in an 
attempt to reduce the variability of earnings by altering discretionary accruals. Therefore, the 
results reveal that none of the contracting hypotheses are confirmed. In contrast, income 
smoothing hypotheses are accepted irrespective of the measure of abnormal accruals. This 
result ties in closely with findings in, Ball et al. (2000), Leuz et al. (2003), and Lang et al. 
(2006), suggesting that pervasiveness of earnings management is more apparent in countries 
with concentrated ownership, weak investor rights and legal enforcement.  
The weak evidence for effects of contracting objectives in the Egyptian context may be 
captured by the strong effects of income smoothing. This means that income smoothing may 
be seen as an attempt by which managers can reduce the variability of the reported earnings 
either to gain personal advantage or attain some contractual objectives. Doing so is likely to 
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increase the likelihood of keeping their jobs (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995), decrease the 
probability of political and governmental intervention as well as increase managerial 
compensation, which in turn can help to signal their ability to the capital market and build 
their reputation. Furthermore, management may tend to use income smoothing as a signal to 
convey private information about the firm’s cash flow and future profitability.  
Another possible explanation for earnings smoothing is based up the results of Goel and 
Thakor (2003) who demonstrate that earnings smoothing may not be determined by self-
interest or leverage concerns, but it is driven by managers’ efforts to increase the firm’s stock 
price by reducing the losses shareholders may bear when they are forced to trade for liquidity 
reasons. Goel and Thakor (2003) argue that earnings smoothing may be desirable by 
uninformed shareholders who trade for liquidity reasons because any increase in the volatility 
of reported earnings are likely to increase their trading losses. Since investors are less likely 
to pay for firms with high earnings volatility, managers may respond and prohibit speculators 
from acquiring private information that could be used to trade against uninformed 
shareholders.  
Collectively, the results of the regression analysis lend credence to the idea that the 
traditional costly contracting incentives provide little explanation for discretionary accruals 
choices in Egypt, while income smoothing activity explains much of the cross sectional 
variation in managerial choices. 
6. Additional tests 
6.1. Alternative discretionary accruals proxies: current discretionary accruals 
It is widely believed that the scope for manipulating non-current accruals (i.e. non-
working capital accruals) is relatively limited for management because they can exercise 
more discretion over the choice of regular revenue and expense items. Therefore, it is 
expected that the (current) working capital discretionary accruals component is an effective 
22 
device for managers to manipulate earnings without being easily detected (DeFond  and  
Jiambalvo, 1994, Teoh et al., 1998 a,b). To assess whether previous results are sensitive to 
the measure of earnings management, the statistical procedures were repeated using only the 
modified Jones current discretionary accruals (MJCDA) and the performance-adjusted 
current discretionary accruals (PACDA) models. The current accruals were calculated as the 
sum of changes in inventory, accounts receivable, and other current assets less changes in 
accounts payable, income taxes payable and other current liabilities. The results in Table 6, 
show models 2 and 4, are qualitatively similar to those reported using total discretionary 
accruals models at a relatively higher R2. The results again confirm the highly negative 
association between discretionary accruals and income smoothing hypotheses and reveal no 
evidence to support the bonus plans, the political costs, or the debt covenants hypotheses.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
6.2. Managerial ownership: piecewise and nonlinearity tests  
Two alternative additional tests were performed to investigate the possibility of nonlinear 
relationship between executive ownership and discretionary accruals similar to that 
documented by Teshima and Shuto (2008). First, we used piecewise linear models as 
EXECOWN is decomposed as follows: 
EXECOWNL  = EXECOWN if EXECOWN < 5%, and = 5% if EXECOWN ≥ 5%; 
EXECOWNM = 0 if EXECOWN < 5%, and = EXECOWN- 5% if 5% ≤ EXECOWN <25%; 
EXECOWNH = 0 if EXECOWN < 25%, and = EXECOWN – 25% if EXECOWN ≥ 25%. 
In unreported tests [10], the results confirm those previously documented. More 
specifically, the coefficient of the intermediate ownership level is negative and none of the 
ownership terms are significant. Second, regression models are re-estimated after including 
a squared term of ownership. The results also show that the coefficients of both ownership 
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variables are not significant for both proxies, suggesting no evidence of a nonlinear 
relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. Furthermore, the 
results do not support any of the traditional contracting hypotheses. However, both measures 
of earnings smoothing are negative and highly significant at the 1 per cent level. 
 
6.3. Prior period discretionary accruals 
Since discretionary accruals revert over the firm’s lifetime (Dechow et al., 2012, 
Dechow, 1994), the discretionary accruals in any period consist of the initial discretionary 
accrual in that period plus portions of prior periods (McNichols, 2000). However, the ability 
of managers to inflate the current period’s reported earnings will doubtless shrink, as the level 
of lagged total accruals rises (Koh, 2007). Hence, the failure to control for reversal of prior 
years’ accruals may lead to seriously invalid conclusions (Kasznik, 1999).  As a result, the 
relation between current period discretionary accruals and lagged accruals is expected to be 
significantly negative. To control for the effects of accruals reversal, we include in the 
empirical analysis lagged total discretionary LAGDA.  
We find that discretionary accruals are subject to short term reversal, although the results 
confirm previous findings concerning the income smoothing hypotheses. To examine the 
possibility that the results reported earlier are not driven by accruals reversal, the regressions 
are re-estimated after including the interactions between LAGDA and efficient contracting 
and income smoothing explanatory variables. One would observe significant coefficients on 
interacting variables if the accruals reversal had significant effects on the prior results. Our 
findings reveal that income smoothing variables remain highly significant and all coefficients 
of interactions are not significant. However, the debt covenant hypothesis only is confirmed 
at the 5 per cent level. These results provide evidence that the initial findings are robust even 
after taking the effects of accruals reversal into consideration. 
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6.4. Size effect 
The results documented above provide little support for the political costs hypothesis. 
Sloan (1996) finds a non-linear relation between total accruals and firm size. To correct for 
this possibility, the statistical analysis was repeated after adding a squared term of firm size. 
Our analysis shows no indication of such a relationship. Another point to note is that the 
smoothing variables are still statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. It appears from the 
correlation matrix that SIZE is highly correlated with other explanatory variables, suggesting 
a need to investigate whether the earlier results will be affected exclusive of SIZE or using a 
different proxy for size; defined as the natural logarithm of sales. The findings are similar to 
those reported above and the results reveal no evidence of a nonlinear relationship between 
earnings management and firm size. 
Despite the careful treatment of the variables used in the analysis and the methodology 
adopted, the results of this study are subject to some caveats. First, as in any accruals-based 
earnings management study, a key concern regarding the explanation of results relies on the 
ability of earnings management proxies to adequately capture earnings manipulation 
activities. It is well-known that measurement errors related to abnormal accruals 
measurement are a concern. Although alternative discretionary accruals models and different 
measurement error-related variables are used, the findings are still not totally free of this 
concern. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that our results are influenced by omitted 
variables. Second, our efficient contracting objectives and income smoothing objectives may 
exhibit considerable measurement error, which may bias the magnitude of the estimated 
effects. For instance, if leverage measures closeness to covenants violation with error, the 
parameter estimates using these surrogates may be biased and inconsistent. Third, corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as board composition, ownership audit quality, that monitor 
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managerial opportunism, are not included in this study. This is because the main objective of 
this study is to document only the trade-offs between contacting and income smoothing 
objectives. Thus, the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in constraining 
opportunistic earnings management is left for other researchers to investigate.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
This study examines whether discretionary accruals choices can be explained by the 
costly contracting incentives, as well as income smoothing.  Accounting discretion has been 
modelled as a function of two competing accounting choices incentives; efficient contracting 
(i.e., bonus plans, debt covenants, and political costs), and income smoothing. The modified 
Jones and performance-adjusted Jones models are used to isolate the discretionary accruals 
component. Based on 438 non-financial Egyptian observations over the period (2005-2007), 
the results indicate that the associations between the measures of earnings management and 
contracting variables are not significant. Overall, the results of regression analysis lend 
support to the notion that the traditional costly contracting incentives provide little 
explanation for discretionary accruals choices in Egypt, while income smoothing activity 
explains much of the cross sectional variation in managerial choices.  
These findings are in contrast with studies that test only one reporting objective at a 
time. More specifically, managers tend to reduce the fluctuations in reported earnings by 
increasing (decreasing) earnings when earnings are low (high) in an attempt to reduce the 
variability of the reported earnings. Such smoothing behaviour is likely to help managers 
retain their position, decrease the probability of political and governmental intervention, as 
well as increasing their compensation, which in turn can help to signal their ability to the 
capital market and build their reputation. Furthermore, management may tend to use income 
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smoothing as a signal to convey private information about the firm’s cash flow and future 
profitability.  
The findings of our study should be of substantial interest to regulators and policy 
makers. The results implicitly contribute to the ongoing arguments in relation to the optimal 
flexibility permitted by standard setters and the reduction in permissible accounting 
treatments in order to improve reporting quality and reduce opportunistic earnings 
management. Many of the weaknesses related to corporate reporting in emerging countries 
may result from the inadequate enforcement of company law as well as the weak legal 
protection of minority shareholders. Our results highlight the crucial role of understanding 
the reporting incentives, in such an environment. There is a greater need to put more 
emphasis on proper enforcement and protecting minority shareholders’ rights, such as 
adopting cumulative voting to give minority shareholders the chance to elect their own 
representatives. 
Several avenues for future research exist. Firstly, whereas the focus of the current study 
is restricted to the contracting and income smoothing objectives, a more comprehensive 
approach is needed to include and test more multiple, even conflicting, motivations especially 
those related to the equity market. Secondly, despite the complexities and difficulties to 
develop such a model, progress towards providing a comprehensive model that explains 
accounting choices would be valuable. Finally, there is a need to refine the discretionary 
accruals models and develop a generally accepted model to appropriately isolate the 
discretionary accruals component and/or focus on alternative measures of earnings 
management such as that are related to real earnings management activities. 
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List of Tables 
Table 1 
Variables definitions 
 
 
Variable Definition 
Discretionary accruals variables  
TACC The total accruals calculated as earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations minus cash flow from operating activities. 
CACC The current accruals calculated as the sum of changes in inventory, accounts 
receivable, and other current assets less changes in accounts payable, income taxes 
payable and other current liabilities. 
TA The book value of total assets. 
ΔREV The change in net revenues between the current year and prior year 
ΔREC The change in receivables between the current year and prior year. 
GPPE The gross property, plant and equipment. 
ROA The return on total assets. 
Dependent variables 
MJTDA The signed total discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets as measured by 
the cross-sectional modified Jones model. 
PATDA  The signed total discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets as measured by 
the cross-sectional performance-adjusted Jones model. 
MJCDA The signed current discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets as measured 
by the cross-sectional modified Jones model. 
PACDA  The signed current discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets as measured 
by the cross-sectional performance-adjusted Jones model. 
Independent variables 
EXECOWN The percentage of equity ownership owned by CEO and executive directors to the 
total shares outstanding. 
DET/EQUITY The ratio of total debts debt to book value of equity. 
SIZE The natural logarithm end-year book value of total assets of firm in million 
(Egyptian) pounds.  
∆CFO Change in cash from operations as measured by cash from operating activities in 
the current year less cash from operating activities in prior year. 
SMOOTH The ratio of standard deviation of operating income and the standard deviation of 
operating cash flow (both scaled by lagged total assets). 
Control variables 
ASSINT The ratio of long-term assets to total assets. 
CFOL A dummy variable that takes the value of one when the cash flow from operations 
is included in the lowest decile (the extreme low CFO) of cash flow from 
operations and zero otherwise. 
CFOH A dummy variable that takes the value of one when the cash flow from operations 
is included in the highest decile (the extreme high CFO) of cash flow from 
operations and zero otherwise. 
EARNL A dummy variable that takes the value of one when the reported earnings are 
included in the lowest decile (the extreme low reported earnings) of reported 
earnings and zero otherwise. 
EARNH A dummy variable that takes the value of one when the reported earnings are 
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included in the highest decile (the extreme high reported earnings) of reported 
earnings and zero otherwise. 
MTBOOK The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity to book value of assets 
EGX30 A dummy variable that takes the value of one when the firm is one of the EGX30 
companies and zero otherwise. 
 
 
Table2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Q1 Median Q3 Min Max 
TACC/lagTA 0.007 0.115 -0.050 0.001 0.062 -0.389 0.551 
CACC/lagTA -0.023 0.122 -0.081 -0.024 0.037 -0.437 0.551 
∆(REV-REC)/lagTA 0.068 0.437 -0.026 0.044 0.125 -1.076 7.896 
GPPE/lagTA 0.678 0.438 0.365 0.678 0.979 0.001 3.101 
lagROA 0.084 0.133 0.029 0.072 0.128 -0.569 1.808 
ROA 0.092 0.110 0.033 0.087 0.143 -0.569 0.471 
MJTDA -0.000 0.105 -0.058 -0.007 0.05 -0.412 0.476 
PATDA -0.000 0.099 -0.058 -0.006 0.052 -0.395 0.434 
MJCDA -0.000 0.107 -0.060 -0.006 0.053 -0.429 0.485 
PACDA -0.000 0.102 -0.062 -0.002 0.059 -0.413 0.441 
EXECOWN 0.106 0.237 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.000 1.000 
DEB/EQUITY 0.411 1.262 0.000 0.131 0.520 -7.197 19.603 
SIZE 12.735 1.562 11.712 12.632 13.782 9.057 17.965 
∆CFO 0.016 0.142 -0.040 0.017 0.080 -0.953 1.015 
SMOOTH 0.949 0.763 0.432 0.758 1.250 -2.506 3.939 
 
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics for 438 observations used in the analyses over the period 2005-
2007. Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 EXECOWN DEBT/QUITY SIZE ∆CFO SMOOTH ASSINT CFOL CFOH EARNL EARNH MTBOOK EGX30 
EXECOWN 1.000            
DEBT/QUITY 0.010 1.000           
SIZE -0.007 0.115*** 1.000          
∆CFO 0.023 -0.006 0.041 1.000         
SMOOTH 0.009 -0.059 0.044** 0.029 1.000        
ASSINT -0.086* -0.034 0.040 0.062 0.062 1.000       
CFOL -0.023 -0.078 -0.131*** -0.370*** -0.024 -0.042 1.000      
CFOH -0.101** -0.034 0.156*** 0.356*** 0.116** 0.128*** -0.110** 1.000     
EARNL 0.014 0.030 -0.235*** -0.020 0.034 0.112***** 0.131*** -0.110** 1.000    
EARNH -0.039 0.059 0.614*** 0.090* 0.018 0.172*** -0.081* 0.242*** -0.108** 1.000   
MTBOOK -0.062 -0.044 0.156*** 0.001 0.023 -0.055 0.053 0.131*** -0.032 0.126*** 1.000  
EGX30 -0.057 0.005 0.418*** 0.029 0.009 -0.097* -0.015 0.065 -0.106** 0.349*** 0.244*** 1.000 
 
Notes: *,**and *** indicate that correlation is significant  at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 1.
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Table 4 
Univariate Analysis 
 
 
The modified Jones total discretionary accruals model The performance-adjusted Jones total discretionary accruals model 
  MJTDA mean 
above variable 
median 
MJTDA mean 
below variable 
median 
t-value Mann-
Whitney 
MJTDA mean 
above variable 
median 
MJTDA mean 
below variable 
median 
t-value Mann-
Whitney 
EXECOWN  0.0041 -0.0036 -1.203 -1.077 0.0070 -0.0025 -0.8076 -0.645 
DEBT/QUITY -0.0039 0.0035 0.750 0.887 -0.0040 0.0035 0.7431 0.609 
SIZE 0.0065 -0.0069 -1.345 -0.504 0.0068 -0.0072 -1.3712 -0.561 
∆CFO -0.038 0.039 -10.155*** -10.030*** -0.037 0.037 -10.165*** -10.002*** 
SMOOTH -0.005 0.004 -4.231*** -5.160*** -0.0071 0.0067 3.3553*** 4.141*** 
 
Notes: Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Regressions of Total Discretionary Accruals on the Contracting Incentives, Earnings Smoothing 
and Control Variables 
 
 
 Pred. sign MJTDA PATDA VIF 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant +/- 0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.020  
  (0.05) (-0.09) (0.02) (-0.40)  
EXECOWN -  -0.024  -0.014 1.11 
   -(1.49)  (-0.90)  
DEBT/QUITY +  0.001  0.001 1.11 
   (0.98)  (1.59)  
SIZE -  -0.001  -0.002 2.12 
   (-0.19)  (-0.52)  
∆CFO -  -0.353***  -0.353*** 1.41 
   (-9.35)  (-9.02)  
SMOOTH -  -0.003***  -0.003*** 1.06 
   (-2.69)  (-2.60)  
ASSINT + 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 1.38 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.15) (0.15)  
CFOL + 0.097*** 0.037** 0.095*** 0.036*** 1.31 
  (4.84) (2.04) (4.69) (2.93)  
CFOH - -0.089*** -0.035** -0.099*** -0.045*** 1.33 
  (-4.70) (-2.29) (-4.98) (-2.73)  
EARNL - -0.114*** -0.104*** -0.109*** -0.098*** 1.14 
  (-6.90) (-7.27) (-6.31) (-6.36)  
EARNH + 0.037 0.033 0.033 0.025 2.03 
  (1.63) (1.33) (1.41) (0.98)  
MTBOOK + 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 1.16 
  (0.49) (0.28) (0.52) (0.26)  
EGX30 + 0.017 0.024 0.019 0.024 1.52 
  (1.01) (1.39) (1.08) (1.34)  
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included  
Time dummies Included Included Included Included  
No of observations 438 438 438 438  
Adj. R square  0.1900 0.3629 0.1830 0.3476  
 
Notes: Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 1. t statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. For the estimation the consistent to 
heteroskedasticity standard errors has been used.  
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Table 6 
Regressions of Current Discretionary Accruals on the Contracting Incentives, Earnings 
Smoothing and Control Variables 
 
 
 Pred. sign MJCDA PACDA 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant +/- -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.021 
  (-0.51) (-0.13) (-0.48) (-0.44) 
EXECOWN -  0.020  0.010 
   (1.38)  (0.75) 
DEBT/QUITY +  0.001  0.001 
   (1.21)  (1.56) 
SIZE -  0.000  0.002 
   (0.07)  (0.44) 
∆CFO -  -0.300***  -0.304*** 
   (-9.40)  (-9.05) 
SMOOTH -  -0.003***  -0.003*** 
   (-2.82)  (-2.63) 
ASSINT + 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 
  (0.97) (1.06) (0.94) (0.98) 
CFOL + 0.115*** 0.065*** 0.111*** 0.060*** 
  (6.35) (3.90) (5.94) (3.50) 
CFOH - -0.112*** -0.067*** -0.119*** -0.073*** 
  (-6.53) (-4.67) (-6.58) (-4.73) 
EARNL - -0.074*** -0.067*** -0.072*** -0.063*** 
  (-4.72) (-4.53) (-4.30) (-3.97) 
EARNH + 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.011 
  (0.91) (0.75) (0.76) (0.44) 
MTBOOK + 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.11) (0.19) (0.18) (0.15) 
EGX30 + 0.022 0.028* 0.023 0.027* 
  (1.49) (1.87) (1.47) (1.71) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included 
No of observations 438 438 438 438 
Adj. R square  0.2339 0.3755 0.2227 0.3566 
 
Notes: Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 1. t statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. For the estimation the consistent to 
heteroskedasticity standard errors has been used.  
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NOTES 
[1] Section 2 provides more discussion for studies related to these objectives. 
[2] See Fields et al. (2001) and Dechow et al. (2010) for a survey of research. 
[3] In essence, using the single account approach is problematic for three reasons 
(McNichols, 2000): First, the explanatory power is expected to be low as it is not clear 
which accrual managers use to manipulate earnings. In addition, the validity of this 
approach tends to be reduced when the aim is to identify the magnitude of manipulation 
rather than testing factors associated with a specific accrual. Thus, the feasibility of 
employing such an approach is questionable since an individual model is required for 
each accrual used to manipulate earnings. Second, the generalizability of findings of this 
approach might be limited due to the small number of firms for which a specific accrual 
is manipulated. Finally, earnings management is associated with aggregate accounting 
adjustments rather than the choice of specific accruals (DeAngelo, 1988).  
[4] The terms discretionary accruals and abnormal accruals are used interchangeably. 
[5] Earnings smoothing is a special case of earnings management involving intertemporal 
smoothing of reported earnings relative to economic earnings to reduce the variability of 
earnings over time (Goel and Thakor, 2003). It is important to note that earnings 
smoothing can be achieved through real activities, real smoothing, or the reporting 
flexibility provided by GAAP through accruals, artificial smoothing. While the former 
reduces volatility by directly affecting the distribution of underlying cash flows, the latter 
directly affects only earnings volatility. Because real smoothing has obvious costs and 
artificial smoothing costs are unobservable, it is less costly for management to smooth 
earnings through accruals (Pincus and Rajgopal 2002; Goel and Thakor 2003).Therfore, 
earnings smoothing in this study is related to artificial smoothing. 
[5]  Due to the high costs of accessing actual debt covenant information, previous accounting 
studies use leverage as a surrogate for the possibility of violating accounting based debt 
covenants. The variables commonly used in prior studies as a proxy for existence and 
tightness of covenant restrictions (i.e., leverage) are the debt/equity ratio, total debts to 
total assets, long-term debt to total assets, and total liabilities to total assets. In the 
presence of secrecy imbedded in the Egyptian environment and the lax oversight, 
obtaining such data is very difficult. In addition, with no legal obligation to disclose such 
data, it is not expected that managers voluntarily disclose such sensitive data.   
[7] Using this proxy assumes that cash flow is free of manipulation, although real activities 
manipulation affects cash ﬂows (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006). 
[8] It is worth noting that dropping firms with missing data might induce a size bias in the 
sample. Against this concern, the size of firms included in the final sample is compared 
with that of firms that have missing data. The results of t-test comparison reveal no 
statistical significant between the two groups of firms, which mitigate the concern of 
selection bias in the sample. 
[9] It is evident that relatively high correlations among some explanatory variables raise 
econometric concern about the possible impact of collinearity on the drawn inferences. 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores and condition indices are calculated to ensure that 
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the sample did not suffer from possible harmful collinearity. Belsley et al. (1980) suggest 
that a condition index greater than 15 signifies a possible problem and in excess of 30 
suggests potentially severe collinearity among the explanatory variables. Since the 
highest VIF score (2.12) is less than 10, multicollinearity is not a problem in this study. 
[10] These results are not reported for the sake of brevity, but are available from the authors 
upon request. 
 
